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 Odd Arne Westad
Over the past two decades China has become integrated in the world economy to an extent unprecedented in the country’s history. When foreign investment returned to China in 
the early 1990s, after the shocks of the Tiananmen events, it was at a pace and level never 
seen before. The combination of a dedicated and cheap workforce and the hope of buying 
into China’s own domestic development led to the country leap-frogging all others in terms of 
foreign direct investment (FDI). Over the course of the whole decade China was second only 
to the United States in attracting FDI – a remarkable change, given that foreign investment of 
any kind had not existed in China prior to 1980. Up to today the changes in China’s economic 
system have to a large extent been driven by the needs created by foreign investors. For 
instance, a legal framework of ownership had to be created to serve those who wanted to 
invest in China. The same framework could then serve China’s own embryonic capitalists. 
Similarly for stock exchanges, insurance arrangements, and quality control. China’s bid to join 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which fi nally succeeded in 2001 (very much thanks to the 
goodwill of the United States), was intended to serve China’s export potential, but also made 
the country sign up to stringent regulations concerning state subsidies (or rather the absence 
thereof), industry standards, copyright protection, and not least opening the Chinese market 
to foreign competition. The international drove the domestic in terms of economic change.
By 2000 the socialist economy in China had lost out to a market economy encouraged by a party 
dictatorship that was still Communist in name. For China’s population it was clear that they were 
living in a new society in which market forces were dominant. State-owned enterprises were sold off, 
downscaled, or allowed to go bankrupt (at least 5,000 such companies have gone bankrupt each year 
since 2000). Those that survived are publicly listed and under the same management regulations as all 
other Chinese companies. For ordinary people this rearrangement means that employers that may not 
have paid them much money, but otherwise looked after them and their children from the moment the 
state assigned them to the factory to the day they died, were now a thing of the past. No more free 
healthcare, kindergartens, schools, housing, holidays, or homes for the elderly. Instead, people had to 
– gingerly – enter a private housing market, search for a good job, and save for their children’s college 
education. Millions of people had to travel elsewhere to fi nd work. China’s capitalism, when it fi nally 
broke through in the 1990s, was very unlike the European and the Japanese variants, with their safety 
nets and entitlements, but remarkably like that of the United States, with its emphasis on mobility, 
opportunity, and personal responsibility.
But it was not only the Chinese population that had to learn a new way of living in the 1990s and 2000s. The 
state had to learn, too. Having given up direct ownership of the economy, it had to create new instruments of 
indirect control, most of them borrowed whole-sale from the West and based on legislation, regulation, and 
fi scal and monetary policy. It was, in many ways, a return to China’s preoccupations of the inter-war period, 
only with a much larger segment of the population involved in the industrial economy. Some critics called it 
a counter-revolution, since the state increasingly saw its main task as serving market-led economic growth. 
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adopted concerns about infl ation, interest rates, credit 
fl ows, and property rights that sounded very similar 
to those of Reaganite America or Thatcherite Britain 
in the 1980s. Capitalism was in the driver’s seat, even 
if CCP leaders would not admit it, and the role of 
the state in advanced capitalist economies – minus 
electoral democracy – was what Beijing was aiming 
for. China’s capitalist revolution of the past twenty 
years has brought the country closer to the outside 
world – and especially to the United States – in terms 
of the aims many people set for themselves or how 
the Chinese state operates than ever before, or at least 
since the Mongol dynasties of the thirteenth century.
Why did the party do it? Founded on an anti-capitalist 
creed in a China in which many people – not only 
Communists – felt that capitalism had brought nothing 
but suffering, exploitation, and humiliation, the move 
from Maoism to market demanded a remarkable 
turn-around not just in ideology but also in mentality. 
For critics of the CCP inside and outside of China the 
answer is simple: the party’s much lauded ‘fl exibility’ 
was a consequence of its long history of manipulating 
the truth and deceiving those who believed in it. Party 
leaders embraced capitalism to enrich themselves and 
their families, and because the plans for the future 
they had once promoted had utterly failed. There is 
obviously some truth to these presuppositions, but they 
are far from the whole truth. The main reason why 
the CCP chose the market was that from the position 
of the early 1990s there seemed to be no other way 
out. Modernity was capitalist. The USSR had – very 
unexpectedly for the Chinese – collapsed, as had the 
socialist states in Eastern Europe. The United States led 
the way towards an increasingly integrated capitalist 
world economy, and those who opted out of it would 
fall behind. The risk of falling behind was what fi rst 
and foremost animated China’s leaders from Deng 
Xiaoping to Hu Jintao. If the race to modernise could 
be better run with Nike trainers, then the Chinese 
Communists would put them on (especially if the 
shoes themselves were made in China). 
A new generation of returned students played a big 
role in China’s capitalist transformation. Even though 
a very large number of Chinese who had studied 
abroad wanted to remain abroad in the 2000s, those 
who did go back to China had the expertise and 
the status to begin introducing new practices, fi rst, 
in private enterprise, and, second, in the state and 
even in the party. By the late 2000s one could get the 
impression that the CCP itself had taken over many 
of the management methods of foreign enterprises: 
quantifi able results for young party brass were all the 
rage among the top cadres of the party. One high-
level CCP member described his training at the party 
academies in terms that anyone with a MPA or MBA 
from Harvard or LSE would recognise. At the same 
time foreign educated academics are transforming 
China’s own higher education. Research output is 
crucial to promotion, and the output is supposed to 
be of international standard. Student concerns are 
increasingly taken seriously by their professors (since 
they are paying customers). When party control and 
academic ambition collide, it is as often the latter that 
wins out as the former.
While consumer choice meant nothing in China before 
the late 1980s, it now means a lot to most Chinese, 
even those who live far from the main cities. The 
preoccupations are very similar to those of the pre-
World War II era: how can modernity – preferably of 
an international kind – be best expressed in terms of 
products. Young people in China today are among 
the most fashion- and brand-conscious in the world. 
Foreign-produced goods generally have the edge, 
even though some Chinese brands are beginning 
to catch up. Music is often American, with liberal 
doses of Canto-pop thrown in. Clothes styles and 
hair styles are Western, mediated through Hong Kong 
and Taiwan. For other products, concerns such as 
environmentalism or sustainability are beginning to 
fi nd their way in, but not on key issues that really 
matter to the Chinese consumer, such as buying a 
car. In China – the world’s largest market for new cars 
in 2010 – the American habit of buying the biggest 
engine your pocketbook can afford is still the rule (with 
predictable consequences: China today has twenty of 
the thirty most polluted cities in the world).
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of China’s capitalist revolution. The other is the way 
people invest in the new economy. The main aim for 
many in China today is to buy their own house or 
apartment. In the cities it can only be done through 
immensely hard work by a young couple, since 
property prices are almost at European levels and 
salaries are much lower. Even though the Chinese 
savings rate is still very high, more and more of it 
– within an extended family – contributes in one way 
or the other to paying off debt. Meanwhile more and 
more young Chinese are investing directly into the 
market, and often fi nd that with some sense added 
to the general expansion that the Chinese economy 
has gone through their investment can earn them as 
much as their salary. All put together, Chinese investors 
– in property and stock – are becoming increasingly 
numerous, and – even though they are not likely to 
be more democratic or less nationalistic than their 
fellow citizens – they have, quite literally, bought into 
a development pattern for China that is quite similar 
to that of Western nations, or Japan or South Korea.
The one area in which China stands out from other East 
Asian states, including Taiwan, in terms of development 
is – ironically enough, given the pretensions of its 
Communist government – the matter of equality. 
While the early Communists had dreamed about a 
China which was modern and strong and socially 
just – and Mao had pursued the topic of equality 
endlessly in his campaigns – China today is one of 
the most socially stratifi ed societies on earth. While 
more than a third of the population – those who have 
not joined the industrial economy – live on slightly 
more than $2 income per day, China has 128 dollar 
billionaires and half a million millionaires. Its Gini 
coeffi cient (the standard used for measuring levels of 
income inequality) is higher than that for any other 
country in its region, and just slightly lower than the 
most unequal countries on earth, such as Brazil. CCP 
leaders defend themselves by quoting Deng’s maxim 
that some people have to get rich fi rst, while presiding 
over increasing levels of inequality. Yet in some areas 
social unrest is rising, with local organisers claiming 
that the party is a tool of foreign exploitation of China. 
For minorities, in Tibet and Xinjiang but also in the 
south, the same party that tried to drown their identity 
in blood during the Cultural Revolution, now drowns 
it in consumer products and market adjustments, 
while increased mobility leads to ever more Chinese 
in minority areas. Capitalism, though victorious in 
China, is in no way uncontested.
The most remarkable story of China’s international 
development over the past thirty years has been its re-
engagement with the rest of Asia. Three decades ago 
China suffered a self-imposed exile from the continent 
of which it is a part. Its only close relationship was with 
North Korea, and even there Beijing had to compete 
for position with Moscow. As if this diplomatic isolation 
was not enough, China had territorial issues with all of 
its neighbours (North Korea included). It was an Asian 
world that seemed to have expurgated China from its 
midst. The central kingdom was no longer central; it 
was distinctly peripheral to the rest of the continent.
While the main reason for China’s marginality was 
its own contrary politics, another key reason could 
be found in the strong economic gains made by 
other Asian economies while China’s own economy 
stagnated. Japan had of course been the pioneer of 
development in the region, with substantial growth 
rates even in the early 20th century. But from 1950 to 
1973 the Japanese economy grew by an average of 
10 percent per year, as did Taiwan. Singapore, South 
Korea, and Hong Kong all grew at 8 percent. In China 
GDP per capita in 1973 was around $800. In Japan 
it was $11,500, in Hong Kong $7,000, in Singapore 
$6,000, and in Taiwan $4,000. China was falling 
further and further behind the leading economies 
in Asia, and even though most Asians would have 
liked to see China open up to their exports, they did 
not actually believe that it was going to happen at 
any point soon.
Compare this with the situation today. China’s own 
economic growth since 1980 has been spectacular, 
averaging near 10 percent, and it has rejoined an 
integrated East Asian system of trade, fi nance, and 
investment. What is more, this growth has taken 
place in a country that has 1.3 billion people in it; 
more than double the population of the rest of East 
and Southeast Asia put together. The journey that 
China has been on over the past generation has been 
intimately linked with its relationship to its neighbours, 
9fi rst those next-door and then into the Southern and 
Western parts of the continent. Indeed, China’s rise 
would have been impossible without it revitalising 
these links. China is now an economic powerhouse 
that all of the rest of Asia orients itself towards, 
and its policies on all matters are of crucial importance 
for the whole region.
The development of China’s economy will be at the 
center of the country’s international affairs for the next 
generation, irrespective of the twists and turns in its 
domestic politics or its diplomacy. The reason for this is 
not only that China is now the second largest economy 
in the world, but the roles it has taken on for this to 
be possible. China is today the world’s workshop, 
the zone where things are made which then end up 
on the shopping lists of Americans, Europeans, and 
Asians alike, and which nearly everyone else aspires 
to possess. This is the country’s current role, and it 
has achieved it by being willing to play the global 
market game according to the rules that were set 
up fi rst by Britain in the 19th century and then by the 
United States in the 20th. In spite of its government’s 
nominal Communism, China has in practice become 
the champion of free market capitalism, internationally 
if not always internally. It is working hard to take on 
the rules of the game and is increasingly concerned 
that others, be it in Africa or Europe, are themselves 
not always doing so. Seen from a Western perspective 
it is hard not to conclude that China is now ‘playing 
our game.’
But as China emerges as the master player of 
international capitalism, it is also obvious that the 
rules of the game are being re-made in China. In 
spite of observations by sceptics, these sinifi ed rules 
so far rarely go in the direction of corporatism or 
state-control, but, at best, in the direction of collective 
decisions and compromise, and, at worst, in the 
direction of corruption and nepotism. It is very unclear 
how Chinese capitalism is going to infl uence practices 
in other countries, especially in cases where there 
are great cultural differences with China. Given the 
massive amount of foreign investment that has fl owed 
into the country over the past decade it is a given that 
over time Chinese fi nancial practices will infl uence the 
foreign companies that do business there. But at the 
moment the Chinese are busy implementing foreign 
rules, for instance on managerial and labour relations, 
in ways that are profoundly changing Chinese society.
The Chinese government today wants to play a strong 
regulatory role in the development of the country’s 
economy. Because China is a political dictatorship, 
all institutions, including private companies, pay 
generous attention to government instructions. 
But in reality the state’s ability to infl uence private 
decision-making is limited, in spite of the repressive 
means at its disposal. In South Korea or Taiwan 
the regimes could set directions because they 
controlled credit and capital-fl ows, and because they 
– and only they – facilitated access to foreign markets. 
The amount of foreign direct investment in their 
industrialisation processes was miniscule, their credit 
companies were under state control, and their main 
fi rms invested nationally for export abroad. In China 
these crucial aspects of industrialisation are turned 
upside down. Foreign investment has driven signifi cant 
parts of the process, foreign banks are operating in 
China and Chinese banks have plentiful means to 
resist government pressure, and the biggest Chinese 
companies have already become multinationals with 
large investments abroad. The domestic Chinese 
growth process since 1990 has not been governed 
by national priorities or fi ve-year plans, but by the 
chaotic interplay of market forces. All of this has 
happened while the state has kept its investments in 
profi table industries, owning or part-owning many 
of China’s biggest companies. But, as one economic 
planner told me recently, state-owned companies are 
increasingly behaving like privately-owned companies 
in the market; they recruit their managers from the 
same pool of talent and they are equally responsible 
for profi ts and losses. They may listen to what the 
government says, but only if it provides a sound 
bottom-line for their company.
At the moment quite a few global investors and 
corporate executives agree that China will re-invent 
global capitalism rather than ruin it. In the wake of the 
crisis of 2008/09, Chinese offi cials and businessmen 
alike began lecturing Western countries on the need 
for market and currency stability, and for avoiding 
corporate greed, bad loans, excessive defi cits, and 
extravagant consumption. Some of this sounds 
laughable, given the amount of bad business practices 
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in China itself. But it does signal that many elite 
Chinese now see themselves as stakeholders in an 
international economic system, on the success of which 
their futures depend. Many people in China (and quite 
a few outside) dream about a future Sino-capitalism 
that will be better organised, more balanced, and less 
destructive than its Western inspirators. So far there 
is little that tells us that will be the case. But, as has 
often happened in the world economy before, those 
who are the generators of global growth innovate 
as well as imitate. Future Chinese leaderships, public 
and private, may be stimulated by the crises they 
have gone through to opt for more regulation and 
government design than we have seen in previous 
versions of world capitalism.
The 2008/09 global fi nancial crisis also showed a 
China that had arrived as a key player in the world 
economy. At the World Economic Forum in Davos in 
2010, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao placed the blame 
for the crisis on the ‘inappropriate’ macroeconomic 
policies of Western countries ‘and their unsustainable 
model of development characterised by prolonged low 
savings and high consumption; excessive expansion 
of fi nancial institutions in a blind pursuit of profi t; 
lack of self-discipline among fi nancial institutions 
and rating agencies and the ensuing distortion of 
risk information and asset pricing; and the failure 
of fi nancial supervision and regulation to keep up 
with fi nancial innovations, which allowed the risks 
of fi nancial derivatives to build and spread.’ Quite a 
handful: the apprentice was taking the past masters 
to task for their excess. But the medicine the CCP 
itself prescribed did not imply that there was anything 
wrong with capitalism as such; instead it implemented 
the largest stimulus program of government spending 
in history, thereby attempting to stave off the worst 
consequences of the crisis for Chinese companies 
and for the Chinese population. Post-crisis growth 
for China will most likely not be of the same scale 
as before, because of international competition and, 
eventually, the country’s aging population. But even 
with ‘only’ six percent annual growth on average, 
China will probably still become the world’s largest 
economy sometime in the mid 2030s.
China’s international position in the 21st century will 
be determined as much by what happens inside China 
as what happens outside its borders. The country’s 
biggest domestic problem is that uneven growth 
has left large regions behind and that the lack of a 
proper welfare system and protection for workers 
against exploitation has led to an extremely high 
level of inequality. While Premier Wen and others 
are lambasting the West for its excesses, inequality 
in China is at least twice as high as in the United 
States or Britain, with higher ratios to relatively 
equal societies such as Germany or France. While 
slowly and uncertainly trying to deal with its worst 
consequences – for instance by re-introducing some 
forms of subsidised education and health care – the 
Chinese government is defending itself by continuing 
to make the argument that ‘a rising tide lifts all boats’. 
The problem is that there are no signs that Chinese 
inequality is abating; on the contrary, the situation 
in the poorer regions is getting worse and worker 
unrest over low pay and atrocious working conditions 
in many factories is on the increase.
In spite of receiving credit for China’s overall economic 
growth, there is little indication that the CCP as a party 
is capable of dealing with some of the social tensions 
this growth is creating. The party’s steady refusal to 
allow increased political pluralism, which could have 
acted as a safety valve against discontent, will make 
Chinese politics more unsettled over time. The CCP 
today is unable to act with massive brutality against its 
own urban population, as it did during the Mao era, 
not least out of fear that such atrocities could unsettle 
the country’s economy. A leading party member told 
me that he thought that even a repeat of 1989 would 
be unthinkable now – ‘just imagine,’ he said, what 
would happen to the country’s credit rating!’. But 
at the same time the party’s leaders gamble all on 
economic growth keeping their people from taking 
action against them. Such gambles rarely pay off.
11
A main reason why China is viewed with such suspicion 
abroad is that it is led by a Communist party. But 
today’s Chinese regime is a far cry from Communists of 
the past. In reality, the regime itself has become much 
more like what Taiwan or South Korea were before 
democratisation – authoritarian, and sometimes ugly 
and brutal, but not capable of atrocities on the scale 
of those of the past, even in its own defence. While 
it is impossible to predict what will happen in Chinese 
politics, I would not be surprised if China follows a 
similar pattern of democratisation to the other main 
states in the region, only stretched out over a longer 
period of time. Whatever happens, the CCP will not 
be around forever, and those foreign observers who 
today equate the party with the country are making a 
major mistake: h istory shows that China is as capable 
of political change as it has recently been of economic 
and social change, and there is no set of engrained 
‘values’ or ‘attitudes’ that will necessarily put the 
country at odds with its neigrbours or with the West. 
As before in its history, China’s direction will ultimately 
be a matter of its leaders’ political choice.■
